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THE RELEVANCE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH  
TO CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT

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## THE RELEVANCE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH TO CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT

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### 1. *DOVES, HAWKS AND OWLS*

During the last decennium we noticed in many European countries *two trends which cause serious concern*. The first trend is an increased sensibilisation of the public opinion for security and defense issues — a sensibilisation which has not been accompanied by an equal increase in the level of information and analytic skills. In my own country, people were asked what percentage of the gross-national product Belgium spends on defense. Half did not know; and the majority of the interviewees who claimed to know exaggerated considerably; nearly a quarter thought that 23 % or more of the GNP was spent in defense. In fact we spend less than 3 % <sup>(1)</sup>. People unencumbered with a knowledge of facts are easy prey for internal and external demagogues. The second trend is a deteriorating consensus of defense policies; in many European countries the discussion has become more polarised. Many factors have contributed to those trends. A major responsibility however could be attributed to the so called «*hawks*» and «*doves*». When one analyzes the approaches of those two groups, one is surprised by the fact that between them there are more similarities than differences. In fact the only great difference is that both claim to strive towards peace. Let me however highlight three similarities. The first is that both hawks and doves have a *tendency to simplify reality*. This is illustrated in their preference for worst-case analyses. Examples of such analyses are e.g. General Close's book «*Europe sans défense*» in which a scenario was depicted that would allow the Soviets in 48 hours to the Rhine. Many nuclear winter scenarios made by doves are typical worst-case products. Talking to such people for

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<sup>(1)</sup> Luc Reyckler, Belgische defensie in de peiling, in *Cahiers van het Centrum voor Vredesonderzoek*, nr. 11, May 1985.

an hour, makes you sometimes feel sixty minutes closer to your dead. The problem with worst-case analysis is that they are not very probable, and tend to distract the attention from more realistic scenarios. Hawks and doves have not only a preference for worst-case analyses, but also suffer of what could be called reductionism. This is a tendency to focus all the attention on e.g. one cause of the armsescalation process and overlooking others. For some the cause is the lack of peace-education; for some it's the existence of militaristic thinking, for others it is the existence of structural violence or military imbalance. A thorough knowledge of international relations shows that armsescalations and wars are multi-causal phenomena, which could only be threatened effectively when one copes with all the major causes at the same time. Hawks and doves should paradoxically as it sounds make not to much abstraction of the complex reality.

A second similarity between hawks and doves is their *intolerance for other points of view*. Both groups are characterised by taboos, strong conformity pressures and the use of passwords. For the hawks the password is NATO: to be for NATO means to be for security; an anti-NATO attitude is considered a security-risk. For doves to be against the cruise-missiles is considered to be for peace; to be for the installation, is considered to be against peace. Such a conformity pressure leaves practically no space for an open discussion. Missiles have become symbols and joined the class of taboos. Both groups tend to be close-minded. When one checks their reading lists or citations one finds the same names over and over. Hawks cite conservative strategists, and doves bona fide peace researchers. Both groups function as closed systems, or systems who are only open for positive and closed for negative feedback. Reinforcing such behavior are their mirror-images of each other. Doves consider themselves more moral, realistic, responsible than hawks, and vice versa.

The third similarity between hawks and doves is their *fanaticism and absolute lack of a sense of humor*. Personally I believe that the reality of international conflicts is serious enough, to not loose its sense of humor. A loss of humor limits ones power to think. Humor is a good way to remove arrogance which stifles thinking. It's also a good cure against cynicism, defeatism, fanaticism and all kinds of doomthinking. The closer we approach the 21st century, the greater I think will be the need to

recreate the function of Courtjesters, or what Sufis called «wise-fools» who had an eye and feeling for the many contractions and paradoxes in reality.

This somewhat caricature comparison of the thinking of hawks and doves, which situate themselves at the two extremes of the security discussion in many European countries, was meant to contrast their way of thinking with thinking of the owl or the scientific approach. The owl's approach is the opposite of both the hawk — and dove — approaches. Instead of simplifying reality, one studies it thoroughly; instead of looking at reality from one point of view, one looks at it from many points of view, and instead of lacking humor, one cultivates it.

## 2. DIAGNOSES AND CURES

The scientist could considerably enrich the discussion about international conflict and conflict-management through his diagnoses. Although diagnoses are not cures, they are preconditions for designing cures. Let us look at three kinds of diagnoses. First *descriptive diagnoses*. Here the analyst strives towards an accurate and uncompromising description of reality. Any over or underestimation of reality enhances the risks and costs of a policy. According to one estimate nearly 3/5 of war initiations since 1910 have been based on errors of perception, judgment and expectation of outcome<sup>(\*)</sup>. An overestimation of threats enhances expensive armsescalations; an underestimation unpreparedness. In order to improve the information content of the public discussion scientists frequently have to assume the role of iconoclasts. It's their duty to debunk the myths and dogmas of hawks and doves. Whenever proponents of a theory resist new facts, while attacking all alternative explanations as heresies, that theory turns in a dogma. At that point, the proponents often try to buttress their case by distorting facts and history<sup>(\*)</sup>. Let us look at some of those dogmas. A first dogma is the *action-reaction model* frequently used for explaining the armsescalation process. For the hawks, the reacting party are the Americans, for the doves the Soviets. An historical analysis however shows that both at different points in time have been actors and reactors. In addition to that one cannot conclude

(\*) Francis Beer, *Peace against war*, 1981, W. H. Freeman & Company, San Francisco, p. 15.

(\*) Fred Iklé, Nuclear Strategy: Can there be a happy ending? in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985.

from the fact that someone frequently ends second in a race, that he/she does not strive to be second to none. A second dogma concerns the called *enemy-and-friend-images*. For the hawks the enemy is the Soviet Union. Doves on the other hand in order to evade the nefarious consequences of enemy-images frequently have the propensity to overlook the negative aspects of the Soviet Union and highlight the positive ones. For a scientist however, both the application of friend — and enemy — images can provide negative consequences; especially when the respective images deviate from reality. The third dogma concerns the so-called «*armement gaps*»; e.g. the bombergap, the missile gap; the window of vulnerability, etc. For the hawks they were real gaps; for the doves they were imaged gaps, tricks to raise unnecessarily the defense expenditures. Although arms presentations could be misused, one should not forget that there were also examples of under-estimations. Some years ago the US mistakenly thought to have a five year lead in MIRVED missiles. Co-responsible for those over — or under — estimations were the imperfect intelligence gathering and analysis systems of the US and the military propaganda policy of the Soviet Union. Chrusthev's bombast language about his nuclear arsenal has considerably contributed to the temporary so called «*missile gap*» at the beginning of the sixties. The last dogma concerns *opinion-polls and referenda*. Opinion polls are very usefull because of their role as communication channels between the citizens and the government. As instruments however to orient the future policies of government or as measures of its the democratic content, they are clearly limited. They could only be recommended on condition that (1) the interviewees are allowed to express their opinion in a nuanced way; (2) to the extent that the opinion is an informed opinion. Some opinion — polls are like Procrustean beds; and others provoke ideal type situations answers. So in order to assess the value of opinion polls and referenda, one should not only judge the nature of the questions, but also the information content on which those opinions are based. Proponents of referenda who neglect those requirements, are either gullible or demagogues of the worst sort.

After debunking some misrepresentations of reality, let's look at the fenomenon of violent conflict in the present world. Since the Second World War we had a name for the next one: the Third World War. However a Third World War never realized; what we had instead were

many Third World Wars. Since W. W. II we noticed approximately 400 small and great violent conflicts—most are located in the third world. Today you can take a plane and observe one of approximately thirty violent conflicts; they vary, from conflicts which are relatively well controlled, as momentarily in the Philippines, where some 15 000 armed guerillas are operating in up to 62 of the nation's 73 provinces, to an Iran-Iraq war which has, according to some estimates, claimed approximately 1.5 million deaths. Most present conflicts are not international conflicts, but internationalized domestic conflicts. In contrast to the Third World, the Northern part of the world could be called a sanctuary. Though heavily armed, East and West has been relatively free of violence. Some authors like Matthew Melko expect this state of peace to continue at least until the middle of the 21st century. His prediction is based on the perception of cycles of peace and war in the Western World. After great wars like the 100 years war which ended in the middle 15th century; the 30 years war; the Napoleonic war, he noticed periods of peace which averaged from 100 to 150 years. After what he calls the World Wars, including the first and Second World War, he expects a similar long period of peace<sup>(\*)</sup>. Although attractive, it's always prudent to consider such predictions as hypotheses; extrapolating the past has always been a risky business. Forecasts based on an insight in the conditions which enhance and inhibit violent behavior are much more reliable.

To call the 20th century the age of violence as some other authors do is probably somewhat exaggerated. It is true that the first and second world wars were catastrophic ones; the first claimed 10 and the second 50 million lives, but there are examples of equally catastrophic wars, such as the Thirty years war from 1618-1648; with most of the action in central Europe. The loss of life during that war has been estimated to have been at least six million, representing 40 per cent of the population of central Europe at that time and as much as 65 per cent of the total populations of several of the embroiled states. Another example of a calamitous war was the Chinese Rebellion of 1850-1864. The so called Tai-Ping movement, was ultimately unsuccessful in its

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(\*) Matthew Melko, *Peace in our Time*, Wright State University (manuscript to be published soon).

long drawn out attempt to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. The final total number of war deaths on both sides is estimated to have been between twenty million and forty million, representing about seven per cent of China's total population at the time. Despite the existence of equally catastrophic wars in previous centuries, there are however some trends which make it different from other centuries. First of all, the fighting of wars has become *more expensive*. The average costs to kill a soldier has been estimated to be 30 dollars for Napoleon, 2100 dollar during WWI, 50 000 during WWII; 200 000 during the Korean War<sup>(5)</sup>. Another trend is the fact that wars have become *more democratised at least in terms of their consequences*. In WWI 5 % of the people killed are civilians; in WWII this number reached nearly 50 %; during the Korean and Vietnam war the percentage of civilians was raised to approximately 80 to 90 %. A third trend is the *greater lethality of the weapons* involved. A United States colonel P. H. Dupuy created a lethality index to evaluate different weapons; the longbow he gave a score of 34 a one megaton warhead a score of 18 billion<sup>(6)</sup>. A more accurate description of our century, than the century of violence, would be the century of potencial annihilation. In some parts of the world the armsescalation has made wars more destructive, in others it has been used to deter wars. Anyway the ongoing armsescalation has not been very cost-effective; it has produced less or eufemistically stated equal security; it taps lots of emotional energy of the citizens whose security is being provided by being hostages and it absorbs lots of intellectual energy. Nearly half a million engineers and intellectuals are involved in the development of new weapons. The threat of greater violence and the high costs of the present security system makes research about international conflict behavior more than relevant. And this brings us to the second kind of diagnosis which aims at getting a better insight into the causes of conflicts, or more precisely into the conditions which enhance the chances of constructive and inhibit the chances of destructive conflict behavior.

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(5) B. V. A. Röling, *Vredeswetenschap*, 1981, Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, Utrecht, p. 38.

(6) In Ralph M. Goldman, *Armscontrol and peacekeeping*, 1982, Random House, New York. p. 11.

### 3. PATHS TO VIOLENT CONFLICT

All the conditions which have been studied with respect to violent conflicts, could be divided into three groups: the *first* group contains research about conflicts. Without conflicts, wars are unthinkable. A thorough analysis of conflicts is than also a *conditio sine qua non* for an effective conflict-management. The *second* group contains studies about the opportunity structure with which the decision-makers are confronted. Here we look at the factors which allow or constrain the use of violence. The *third* group contains research about decision-making processes. Wars are no accidents; they are made by men. They could be decisions based on the expectation that the benefits will be higher than the costs or on the perception that the use of violence was the only option left.




Figure 1. Three clusters of variables inhibiting or enhancing violent conflicts.

Let me focus at each cluster of variables more carefully.

#### A. Conflicts

##### *Symmetric and asymmetric conflicts*

With respect to conflicts, I would like to highlight *three points*. First of all, it is clear that the chances of war increase when the interests at state are raised. Interests can vary from periphery —, primary —,



vital — and survival interests. The more the latter are threatened by an opponent, the greater will be the propensity to use violence to secure them. A relevant distinction to be made is that between symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. Symmetry could be measured in terms of the power of the conflicting parties, but also in terms of the interests at stake. The latter distinction is very important if one wants to predict e.g. the outcome of war. One out of five international wars has been won by the weaker party.

Research data show that superior will tends to be related to the interests at stake; and that it occasionally may give the advantage to the weaker party.

### *Manifest and latent conflicts*

The second point I would like to highlight is the distinction between manifest and latent conflicts. The world is full of latent conflicts; conflicts that are now latent, but could explode later and drastically change the international scene. Iran is a case in point. For a long time the Americans invested in the Shah, to develop his country as a stronghold of the Free World. A revolution was not predicted. Now it's a hotbed of fundamentalism and involved in one of the bloodiest wars going on. There are many other countries which are walking a tightrope. The Philippines is one of them. If Marcos fails to provide reforms and a capable successor, most analysts agree, the Philippines could tumble into a military dictatorship or a communist take over within five years. As former U. S. Ambassador William Sullivan puts it, it has suddenly become the most dangerous, unsettling and destabilizing problem anywhere on the Pacific rim<sup>(7)</sup>. To cope with conflicts effectively, one should be able to discern latent conflicts and understand the conditions which enhance their actualization.

### *Peace is not always the highest value*

The last point I like to make with respect to conflicts concerns the value of peace. We believe that all nations strive towards peace

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(7) The Philippines: another Iran?, in *Newsweek*, November 4, 1985.

is a dangerous illusion. At one point Hitler was quoted to say that peace was his greatest treasure. In his book *In War* Clausewitz writes that the aggression always pretends to be peace loving because he would like to achieve his goals without bloodshed and that, therefore, aggression must be presented as a defensive reaction by the aggressive nation. Besides an awareness of the use and misuse of the term peace, one should also know that although men desire peace, it is generally not their highest value. If it were, peace and peaceful change could easily be achieved; a nation need only refuse to defend itself. Throughout history, however, people have placed other values and interests above their desire for peace. From this perspective the basic task of peaceful change is not merely to secure peace; it is to foster change and achieve peace that secures one's basic values. Determining how this goal is to be achieved in specific circumstances is the ultimate task of wise and prudent statesmanship<sup>(8)</sup>. The third reason why one has to be carefully with use of the term «peace» is that a similar situation could be judged by some as peaceful, by others as not so peaceful; for the simple reason that they use different criteria for assessing a situation. Some years ago, I did a study of diplomatic thinking and asked diplomats from more than 100 countries what indications they use for assessing the international environment as peaceful<sup>(9)</sup>. All the diplomats used more than one indicator. With respect to «absence of violence» as an indicator of peace there was overall consensus; but with respect to other indicators there were significant differences. Diplomats from the industrialized countries in the North stressed e.g. stability and order as a major indicator; the other hand diplomats from developing countries stressed the absence of structural violence or non-interference as indicators of crucial importance. Somewhat paradoxically one could conclude that striving towards peace is frequently the cause of conflicts and wars. In the same way wars could be seen as a confrontation of two different peace concepts.

Let us now turn to the second cluster of variables that influence the conflict-dynamic; namely the structure of opportunities and constraints with which the decision-makers are confronted.

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<sup>(8)</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 1983, Cambridge University Press, p. 209.

<sup>(9)</sup> Luc Reychele, *Patterns of diplomatic thinking*, Praeger, New York, 1979.

## B. Opportunity structure

Game theory has convincingly indicates that behavior is not only a function of the nature of the conflict and conflict-parties, but also of the context within which conflicts are situated. In a prisoners dilemma environment one will find it rational not to cooperate, in the other hand in a chicken-game environment cooperation will be considered to be the most rational policy-option. With respect to the opportunity-structure, let me highlight three principles. First of all:

### *Power creates opportunities*

On the one hand it is clear that without conflicts there will be no war. On the other hand one should be aware that an accumulation of weapons creates possibilities and temptations to use them. A study of 15 Asian nations between 1946 and 1970 found that «sharp increases in military assistance tend to change the recipient nation's international behavior toward increased conflict and decreased cooperative behavior<sup>(10)</sup>. Further, although weapons are generally meant to enhance its own security, they tend to diminish the feeling of security of the other party. This is caused by the fact that no weapons are absolutely defensive; they could be used as tool for aggression and thereby threaten the opponent. This is a clear case, where the solution has become an additional cause of the problem. The perception of weapons as symptoms of underlying conflicts is correct, but also dangerous; especially when it would lead to the conclusion that one should primarily focus on conflict-control and overlook the importance of controlling arms.

### *Power is complex*

The second principle to be stressed is that power is a complex phenomenon. Power can be used in many ways: states can attempt to persuade others to do something they might otherwise not do; states may seek to use their resources to reward other states for doing what they want: states may threaten other states with punishment if they do not

<sup>(10)</sup> See Beer, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

act in accordance with expressed desires; or they may use direct military or economic force to try to get a state to behave in accordance with the expressed wishes. Whether a state uses persuasion, rewards, punishment, or force to influence the behavior of another state, the effectiveness ultimately depends upon its power position. Numerous attempts have been made to measure the power of nations. Sophisticated measures include tangible and intangible components of power and stress that power is ultimately based on a subjective perception. A sophisticated measure has e.g. been developed by Ray Cline. According to Cline, power can be measured by adding the value of tangible values (such as population, territory, economic and military capability) and multiplying them by the value of such intangible elements as clarity of national goals, leadership, and the will to carry out national goals<sup>(11)</sup>.

$$PP = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

Pp = perceived power

C = critical mass = population + territory

E = economic capability

M = military capability

S = strategic purpose

W = will to pursue national strategy

Figure 2. Ray Cline's conceptual framework for measuring national power.

Capability is important, but the manner it is used is even more important. Napoleon introduced neither a new weapon nor a new tactical system. Although he was a tactician of genius, his principle impact on warfare was the injection of new and imaginative ideas into grand tactics and strategy—the most important of these were his concepts of mass and maneuver. An indication of the potential and actual lethality of ideas can be obtained from the comment of one of his enemies. Blücher, who stated that Napoleon's mere presence in a battle or campaign was worth at least 40 000 men<sup>(12)</sup>.

<sup>(11)</sup> Ray Cline, *World Power Trends and U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1980's*, 1980, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

<sup>(12)</sup> Col. Trevor Dupuy, *The evolution of weapons and warfare*, 1984, Hero Books, Fairfax, Virginia.

### *Power is contextual*

The third principle I would like to highlight is that power is contextual. The propensity to use violence depends on the characteristics of the international environment in which it could be used. In the present international system which is anarchic and has an Hobbessian moral-political climate, the use of violence or violent threats are common currency. This is true of the world as a whole. There are however parts that are more peaceful; regions where states do not expect their conflicts to be resolved by means of violence. Those are the so-called pluralistic security communities; groups of democratic countries within the European or the Atlantic Community. Within such communities military power is not very relevant. Here power-hierarchies other than the military, play a role. In the rest of the world however the distribution of military power has still a great impact on the chances of peace. Many students of international relations have studied the impact of different balances of power and changes thereof and of bipolar and multipolar system on the chances of war and peace. The conclusions are frequently contradictory but some general lessons can be drawn. A first conclusion is that there is no structure that guarantees peace, the only thing one can say is that some are more violence prone than others. Parity e.g. did seem to deter countries from becoming involved in violent conflicts, but once involved, it appears that the more equal the countries are, the more intense the conflicts are. For policy-makers, it depends on what they are willing to risk; the chance of deterring hostilities, or the chance of keeping hostilities at a low level. Certainly these considerations are crucial for large powers contemplating to provide aid to smaller powers; aid that could shift the power-balance among them. The answer unfortunately is not simple. In addition, the finding that closing a power gap is more dangerous than widening a gap, would certainly be another consideration for decision-makers contemplating aid to a smaller country to make it more equal to its adversaries. So, power balances and imbalances make a difference.

Now what about the number of powers; one, two, three or more? Bipolarity, tripolarity and multipolarity, consistently showed greater adhesion to war

variables than unipolarity<sup>(13)</sup>. A number of statistical studies seem to indicate that the chances of war in a bipolar world are lower, but if they occur they are likely to be very dangerous and have far reaching consequences. The opposite is expected in a multipolar system. The probability war is higher, but the consequences lower<sup>(14)</sup>. In summary, one could say that the structure of the international systems and shifts thereof are critically important determinants of the behavior of states. The structure of the international system constrains behavior and imposes costs on any behavior that seeks to change the international status-quo. Similarly any redistribution of interstate capabilities may decrease or increase the costs of changing the international system. However, the tendency of a society to seek changes in the international system is dependent not only on decreased costs but also on domestic factors that influence the capacity and willingness of a society to play these costs. This brings us to the third set of explanatory variables, which could be labelled: the decision-making.

### C. Decision-making

The use of violence as a political option is not only determined by the nature of the conflict and the available power, but above all by the reality perceived by the decision-makers. In other words, not only interests and power, but also perceptions and misperceptions can raise or lower the probability of peace or war. Let me highlight three major problems which have captured lots of attention in the research community.

#### *Forecasting difficulties*

The first one concerns the problem of forecasting. Many forecasts have been wrong; some with happy consequences, some with disastrous consequences. Two decades ago, the British scientist and novelist C. P. Snow predicted nuclear war within a decade as a «mathematical certainty»<sup>(15)</sup>. Luckily he was wrong. However, a lot of the predictions

<sup>(13)</sup> Michael P. Sullivan, *International Relations: Theories and Evidence*, 1976, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., p. 196.

<sup>(14)</sup> See Beer, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

<sup>(15)</sup> G. Allison, et. al., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls*, 1985, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, p. 207.

have scored disastrous consequences. The statesmen at the beginning of the century had no memory of any previous general war except some of them remembered the Franco-Prussian War, which had been resolved in six weeks. This made them more receptive to war as a possibility in the summer of 1914. The general populace moreover, was likely to succeed because war was considered interesting a kind of summer sport that one might follow in the daily papers, while supporting the home team.

An interesting study made by Stoessinger titled «Why nations go to war» reveals as the most important precipitating factor in the outbreak of war, a misperception of the adversary's power<sup>(18)</sup>.

It is vital to remember that it is not the actual distribution of power that precipitates war; but the way in which a leader thinks that power is distributed. Stoessinger states «A war will start when nations disagree over their perceived strength, and that war will end when the fighting nations perceive each other's strength more realistically. Such misperceptions contributed to the first world war, to Hitler's attack on Russia, to MacArthur's advance through North Korea toward the Chinese border, to America's failure in Vietnam, to the Arab invasion in Israel in 1948, etc. In other words wars frequently start as a consequence of wrong cost—benefit analyses. The estimation of consequences is of course very difficult and consequentially such estimates contain a great deal of subjectivity. But the preference should still go to estimations made by people with experience, whose «subjective probability estimate» tend to less inaccurate than the ones made by dilettants.

### *Crises should be prevented*

A second area of problems which captured the attention of a major group of decision-making analysts are international crises and their impact on the decision-making quality. The term crisis refers to unanticipated situations where a lot is at stake, and where the decision-maker has not much time to make a decision. Despite the fact that the Chinese have

<sup>(18)</sup> J. Stoessinger, *Why Nations go to War*, (second edition), 1978, St. Martin's Press, New York.

two characters for crisis: one connoting danger and the other opportunity, danger seem to be the predominant characteristic of crisis. Ole Holsti, e.g. has shown that the stress on policy-makers resulting from an overload of communication and strong time pressure, as well as anxiety, threat and fatigue, tends to reduce sharply the number of alternatives that could be seriously considered. He also found that under these conditions policy-makers tend to single out threats from the flood of incoming communications and pay less attention to offers of negotiations, conciliating messages and the like<sup>(17)</sup>.

These and others nefarious influences have accentuated the importance of crisis management techniques. This brings us to the third problem area: the relation between communication and conflict.

#### *Need for continuous communications*

Since the outcome of decisions are co-determined by the other involved parties continuous communication is of great importance. John Burton e.g. stresses the need for more effective communication between the representatives of the conflicting parties<sup>(18)</sup>. By effective communication is meant the deliberate conveying and accurate receipt and interpretation of what was intended to be conveyed. Communication makes empathy possible, and therefore a requirement for a more sophisticated kind of realism.

After this short survey of those three groups of factors determining conflict behavior: conflicts; opportunity structures and decision making, let me now move to the third contribution a scientist can make to the security and defense debate: namely through his *prescriptive diagnoses*.

#### 4. PEACEFULL CHANGE

The scientist can help to distinguish the different methods for conflict management; if possible design new ones; and assess their respective pros and cons limits and possibilities.

<sup>(17)</sup> Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation*, 1977, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 285.

<sup>(18)</sup> John Burton, *Conflict and Communications*, 1969, Macmillan, London.



In order to manage conflicts effectively one has to work at the same time on each of the earlier discussed determinants, this means:

- conflict requires conflict-control
- opportunity structure requires opportunity structure control
- and decision-making requires decision-making control.




Figure 3. Clusters variables for peaceful international conflict-management.

### A. Conflict control

As previously stressed, a good conflict dossier is a *conditio sine qua non* for an effective control of conflicts. In addition to that one should be acquainted with the manifold techniques of regulating conflict. An interesting contribution to negotiation is e.g. Roger Fisher's latest book titled «Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in»<sup>(19)</sup>. In it the author stresses (1) to separate the people from the problem; (2) to focus on interest and not on positions; (3) the need to invent options for mutual gain; (4) and the importance of using objective criteria.

### B. Opportunity structure control

In addition to coping with conflicts, one should also spend a great deal of energy on controlling the opportunity structure. Such measures

<sup>(19)</sup> Roger Fisher & William Ury, *Getting to yes: Negotiating Agreement without giving in*, 1983, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.

could be of a political-diplomatic, economic, moral, legal, or military nature. Let me limit my attention to measures, effecting the military environment: specifically armscontrol. The aim of armscontrol is generally considered threefold: (1) to reduce the risks of war; (2) to limit the damage if war breaks out; (3) to reduce the costs of security. To realise those goals one can distinguish many methods which can be classified by the stage at which they are meant to work; which leads us to four stages<sup>(20)</sup>.

#### *Four kinds of armscontrol*

1. Arms control at the stage of the development of specific weapons or forces.

Numerous forms of armscontrol are intended to bar or inhibit the development of weapons and armed forces. There is e.g. the much debated ABM treaty, which bans the development and testing of various hypothetical anti-ballistic missile systems. This treaty should, I think, not be dropped, but renegotiated, or in order to close its many loopholes, or to develop an agreed upon partial defense system e.g. to defend the countries involved against accidental or unauthorised launchings. An anti-satellite treaty could also be situated at this level.

2. Armscontrol at the stage of deployment.

Once arms and forces have been developed there are numerous forms of restraint that have been adopted or should be realized.

Limits may be placed on numbers, size and types of specific weapon systems, such as those proposed in the START negotiations or in the Geneva Summit. In addition there can be geographic limits on deployment, such as those embodied in the Outer Space treaty or the various MBFR proposals. Limits can also be placed on the distribution of weapons and weapons related technologies to other states, as already practiced with

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<sup>(20)</sup> This classification is borrowed from Patrick Morgan, *Arms Control in International Politics, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, Working Paper, n.º 48, 1985, University of California, Los Angeles.*

nuclear weapons. With respect to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty one could explore sanctions against proliferators. To this end, the United States could explore with others, including the Soviet Union, a plan for imposing agreed upon political, economic and security sanctions on countries that violate non-proliferation commitments or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives<sup>(21)</sup>. Also relevant at this stage of armscontrol are certain kinds of confidence building measures which e.g. limit on the size or frequency of maneuvers or which limit offensive deployments. Finally, this category also includes unilateral or multilateral efforts to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of weapons and forces. Actions to take could be a reduction on short-rang theater nuclear weapons. Those weapons pose a real danger of accidental use in peacetime and especially in the «for of war».

One could also add safety devices and procedures and upgrade warning systems.

### 3. Armscontrol at the stage of decision to use force.

The threat of military resistance or retaliation is in itself a means of armscontrol. In other words deterrence should be perceived as a major armscontrol measure, particular by deterrence based on nuclear weapons, where the ultimate goal is to never have to use them. The threat of war and the use of force and war, have historically been governed by a fundamental relationship between destructiveness and probability of war. The more potentially destructive a war seemed to be, the less the probability of its occuring, and vice versa. The pacifist Leo Tolstoy appreciated this relationship, and prayed that wars would become sufficiently destructive so that men would refuse to fight them. With this in mind it would be appropriate to maintain a credible deterrent; to adopt a no first use policy only after having obtained a conventional deterrent, and to take measures to enhance crisis stability. This would imply e.g. to take measures to prevent decapitation; and a disapproval of accepting a launch on-warning policy or of the development a first strike capability.

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<sup>(21)</sup> *Hawks, Doves, and Owls*, op. cit., p. 240 a.o.

And finally one should not assume that nuclear deterrence will last forever. Therefore search for alternatives to deterrence has to be intensified.

#### 4. Armscontrol at the stage where force is used.

Once military forces are used, the costs and harmful consequences can mount steeply, and there are several armscontrol measures that can be employed at this stage. If a nuclear war ever occurs, a top priority will be to stop it. One should e.g. plan for ending a war if it begins; develop survivable US—Soviet communications; and plans for a non-early use of nuclear weapons. One should also prepare decision-makers to deal with nuclear crises and work with the Soviets to prevent and manage crises. More specifically, the United States and the Soviet Union should seek to create a jointly staffed crisis-monitoring center along the lines proposed by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner<sup>(22)</sup>. Among its virtues, the fact finding role of such a center could provide a useful mechanism for introducing a pause early in a crisis.

Those were some armscontrol measures that would change the opportunity-structure so that the international security would be enhanced. Let us now move to the third area of control; decision-making control.

### C. Decision-making control

#### *Limit misperceptions*

With respect to decision-making I would like to stress the importance of limiting misperceptions and the need to invigorate the proliferation of democracies. Although no one can predict the future, the fact is that both leaders and the public act on estimations of the trend of events, and prognostications frequently become self-fulfilling prophecies.

It is therefore prudent to turn to the history of international relations and seek an understanding of the dynamics of world politics for guidance. It is important to appreciate the dangers, as well as the opportunities of the present moment. Dispassionate analysis in an era of rapid change is a must to help avoid most wars.

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<sup>(22)</sup> *Hawks, Doves and Owls*, op. cit., p. 237.

Another important way to limit misperceptions, is the organisation of regular meetings with Soviet leaders. Regular discussions between American and Soviet officials at the summit, cabinet, high military, and working levels could considerably enhance the mutual understanding of how each side sees its own interests, the others and the risks. If such meetings are held at regular intervals, they would become routine, thus reducing political preasure for tangible results from each session. One should also avoid treating nuclear weapons like other weapons; or exaggerate military unbalances, and certainly never cut of communications as a sanction <sup>(23)</sup>.

### *Invigorate a proliferation of democracies*

The second aim to pursue with respect to decision-making control is to stimulate the proliferation of democratic regimes in the world. Less than a third of all countries have free democratic regimes; the majority of nations live under military authoritarian, or totalitarian governments. This has serious implications for peaceful conflict resolution. There has been research that indicates that representative governments are less likely to fight one another, and, in the past two centuries, they were more likely to produce long periods of peace <sup>(24)</sup>. The expansion of representative governments in fact, as well in form, would also enhance the chances of enlarging the present pluralistic security communities and also of the detente process.




Figure 4. Complex interdependency internal — and external detente.

In this context it is important to stress the complexity of the interaction between internal and external detente.

Contradictory to many expectations, external detente does not always result in internal detente.

<sup>(23)</sup> See *Hawks, Doves and Owls*, op. cit.

<sup>(24)</sup> See Melko, op. cit., p. 258.

As external detente increases, pressure for internal freedom and decentralisation; a situation which makes most undemocratic governments nervous; and forces them to take actions which have a negative impact on external detente. In addition totalitarian or authoritarian states have the propensity to use more readily enemy-images, as a classic tool to legitimize the internal want of freedom. The so-called great feeling of insecurity of the Soviet Union is not only caused by the traumatic war experiences which resulted in the loss of 20 million lives but also by the primordial importance of its state-security. The revolution of 1917, the purges of the twenties and the collectivisation programs under Stalin, requested the lives of approximately 11 to 15 million citizens. Real progress in international security is therefore only possible when parallel efforts are being made at the level of external and internal detente.

## *5. CONCLUDING REMARKS*

At the beginning of my speech I stated that in many places in Europe, the discussion about security and defense became polarized and that the general consensus deteriorated. The critique side focusses not so much on the interests to be secured, but on the way those interests are being secured. I believe that Europe in terms of security is at a turning point. Many factors, external and internal, will force Europe to take a greater responsibility for its own security. The Americans, not only the conservatives, but also the liberals continue to insist on a more equitable burden sharing. The Soviets are doing their best to split not only the Americans apart from their European allies, but also to drive a wedge between the French and British and their non nuclear neighbours in Europe.

In addition to external factors, there are also internal ones, of a strategic economic and political nature. A better integrated European defense would enhance the credibility of its defense; make the European security more cost effective, and make it easier for the European citizens to identify with their defense. To develop a better European security policy, we need to create a climate, or a forum, where the future of Europe can be discussed in, with an open-mind and on an informed basis.

In this short time span I have highlighted some contributions researchers can make. It is an irony however so great as to border on absurdity that the Western European allies alone spend on a yearly basis, nearly 100 billion dollars on security and defense, and that scientific research about how we could enhance our security at less risks and in a more cost-effective way, has been pursued by only a handful of specialists, spending by comparison, or mere pittance. A greater effort should be made to strengthen such research, and here small countries would certainly play a major role.

Adlai Stevenson once stated that «power corrupts but lack of power corrupts absolutely». In many cases I think it's true; a feeling of powerlessness can lead to apathy; but it needs not to be like that. Small powers are limited in terms of their material contribution to the Atlantic and European security, but they could play a major role in the search and re-search of better security and defense alternatives.

*Luc Reyckler*